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This  paper  studies  a  class  of  games  of  perfectly  coinciding  interests  with  a  preplay  communication  stage  added.  If  messages 
are  costless  (cheap  talk),  there  are  inefficient  Nash  equilibria  even  under  communication.  However,  I  show  that  only  strategies 
that  induce  efficient  outcomes  are  evolutionarily  stable. 
1.  Introduction 
That  we  cannot  guarantee  efficient  outcomes  in  coordination  games  with  perfectly  coinciding 
interests  is  a major  problem  in  game  theory.  It  is  especially  troubling  when  we  assume  communica- 
tion  is  possible.  We  have  a  strong  intuition  that  communication  solves  coordination  problems. 
Recently,  this  intuition  has  been  used  in  an  axiomatic  fashion  to  refine  Nash  equilibrium  [in,  e.g. 
Farrell  (1987,  1988)  and  Rabin  (1990)].  There  is,  however,  no  accepted  noncooperative  foundation 
for  this.  The  introduction  of  costless  signals,  or  cheap  talk,  does  not  affect  the  set  of  Nash  equilibria 
that  can  be  induced  in  the  underlying  game. 
Elsewhere  [Wameryd  (1990)],  I  apply  the  concept  of  evolutionary  stability  to  coordination  games 
with  imperfect  information  of  the  type  studied  in  seminal  contributions  by  Crawford  and  Sobel 
(1982)  and  Lewis  (1986).  In  Kim  and  Sobel  (1990)  and  Matsui  (1991)  more  involved  criteria  based 
on  evolutionary  concerns  are  applied  to  games  of  the  type  to  be  studied  here.  In  particular,  Matsui 
shows  that  only  efficient  outcomes  fulfill  this  criterion  of  cyclical  stability  in  2  X  2  games  of 
coinciding  interests.  In  this  paper,  I  show  that  the  simpler  criterion  of  evolutionary  stability 
[Maynard  Smith  (1982)]  suffices. 
The  evolutionary  stability  point  of view  seems  a natural  one  to take  for  purposes  of  explaining  the 
effects  of  communication.  Verbal  utterances,  or  any  other  costless  signals,  can  only  be  said  to  have 
specific  meanings  in  relation  to  established  conventions  of  interpretation.  Such  conventions  neces- 
sarily  arise  out  of  historical  processes  of  trial  and  error  and  imitation.  While  it  does  not  get  into  the 
details  of  such  processes,  the  criterion  of  evolutionary  stability  puts  some  reasonable  restrictions  on 
their  stable  states. 
Section  2  introduces  a  class  of  2  x  2  pure  coordination  games  with  cheap  talk.  I  show  that  these 
games  have  inefficient  equilibria,  since  cheap  talk  does  not  affect  payoffs.  In  Section  3,  I  instead 
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apply  the  notion  of  evolutionarily  stable  strategies.  Only  communication  strategies  that  induce 
efficient  outcomes  fulfill  the criterion  of  neutral  stability.  Finally,  in  Section  4,  I  note  that  this  result 
does  not  generalize  to  games  with  more  than  two  strategies. 
2.  The  model 
Consider  the following  2 x  2 game  with  perfectly  coinciding  interests.  The  players  share  the  action 
set  A  =  { uH,  uL}.  The  payoffs  are  the  following. 
aH  aL 
aH 
aL 
PH,  PH 
0, 0 
0, 0 
PL,  PL 
We  will  assume  that  pH >pL  > 0.  Pure  coordination  games  of  this  type  are  sometimes  called 
unanimity  games  [see,  e.g.,  Harsanyi  and  Selten  (1988)].  They  can  be  seen  as  models  of,  for  instance, 
simple  bargaining  situations. 
The  pure  strategy  equilibria  of  this  game  are  (a,,  uH)  and  (a,,  aL).  They  are  strict  in  the  sense 
that  they  have  no  alternative  best  replies.  Therefore  the  inefficient  outcome  cannot  be  ruled  out 
according  to  any  standard  refinement  criteria,  including  evolutionary  stability. 
Now  extend  the  game  by  allowing  each  player  to  send  a costless  signal  from  the  finite  set C,  with 
1  C 1 2  1  A 1, prior  to  actual  play.  The  term  costless  signal  is  used  to  indicate  that  these  actions: 
(1)  Do  not  affect  the  payoffs  of  the  underlying  game,  and 
(2)  Do  not  have  any  particular  meanings.  1 
In  other  words  the  communication  stage  consists  of  cheap  talk. 
Let  U =  C x  C  be  a player’s  set  of  information  sets  reached  after  communication.  Note  that  if  a 
player  is  at  the  information  set  (u,  u’),  then  his  opponent  is  at  the  information  set  (u’,  a).  A  pure 
strategy  for  the  game  with  communication  is  the  choice  of  a  signal  u  to  send  and  a  function  $I: 
U -+ A.  The  function  I#I  specifies  an  action  for  each  of  a  player’s  possible  information  sets  after  the 
communication  stage.  Let  P(u+,  u’+‘)  be  the  payoff  to  a  player  using  a+  against  an  opponent 
playing  a+  Note  that  p(u+,  u’+)  = P(u’+‘,  a+). 
Signals  that  do not  affect  payoffs  and  do not  have  conventional  meanings  in  some  language  seem 
intuitively  useless.  It  is  easy  to  verify  that  the  communication  game  has  inefficient  equilibria  where 
both  players  choose  strategies  of the  type  u’+‘,  where  $J’ =  aL  for  all  u E  U. Although  not  strict,  these 
equilibria  involve  undominated  strategies  and  are  therefore  perfect  in  the  sense  of  Selten  (1975). 
3.  Evolutionary  stability 
A  more  natural  approach  to  communication  than  the  study  of  one-shot  games  is  to  ask  which 
semantic  conventions,  i.e.,  systems  of  assigning  meaning  to  signals,  would  be  stable  through  repeated 
’  Signals  will  be  said  to  be  associated  with  meanings  only  in  evolutionarily  stable  conventions.  It  would  seem  strange  to 
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interactions  in  a large  population  of  players.  The  concept  of  evolutionary  stability  [see,  e.g.,  Maynard 
Smith  (1982)  or  van  Damme  (1987)]  offers  a  criterion  based  on  such  a viewpoint. 
Definition  I  (evolutionary  stability).  Let  r  be  a  symmetric  two-player  game  with  strategy  set 
s=  {sl,  Q,...,  s,  }  and  payoff  function  P:  S2  --* R  that  are  the  same  for  both  players.  A  strategy 
s’  E  S  is  said  to  be  an  evolutionarily  stable  strategy  (ESS)  of  r  if,  for  all  s E  S, 
p(s*,  s*>  >  P(s,  s*>, 
or,  if  P(s*,  s*)  = P(s,  s*),  then 
p(s*,  s)  > P(s,  s).  (2) 
The  definition  implies  that  an ESS  is a symmetric  Nash  equilibrium  strategy.  In  case  the  equilibrium 
is  not  strict,  the  strategy  must  fulfill  an  additional  criterion.  Note  that  both  strategies  of  the  game 
without  cheap  talk  are  ESS. 
Although  a  criterion  ostensibly  defined  for  bimatrix  games,  we  should  really  think  of  the  ESS 
concept  as  a  dynamic  stability  concept  for  populations.  Consider  a  large  population  of  identical 
players  who  meet  randomly  in  pairs  in  each  period  to  play  the  bimatrix  game  r.  Let  all  players 
adhere  to  the  same  symmetric  equilibrium  strategy.  Then  the  ESS  criterion  can  be  shown  to  be 
equivalent  to requiring  that  no  small  group  of  deviators  adhering  to a different  strategy  can  do better 
against  the  dominant  strategy.  In  evolutionary  terms,  it  guarantees  that  no  such  alternative  strategy 
can  grow  over  time,  through,  e.g.,  imitation,  to  take  over  domination  of  the  population. 
The  ESS  criterion  is very  restrictive.  In  fact,  the  cheap  talk  game  does  not  have  an  ESS.  However, 
the  concept  can  be  weakened  in  a  reasonable  manner  to  allow  for  sets  of  strategies  that  are 
collectively  stable  against  deviation.  It  is, done  by  replacing  the  strict  inequality  in  (2)  by  a  weak 
inequality.  We  call  strategies  fulfilling  the  weaker  criterion  neutrally  stable  strategies  (NSS). 
Proposition  1. A  strategy  a$  is a  NSS  if  and  only  if  (P(a&  m$)  = pH 
To  prove  the  ‘if’  part,  let  a+  be  such  that  P(u+,  a$)  =pH.  Let  a’+’  be  an  alternative  best  reply  to 
u$$Ve  must  have  that  P(u’u’,  a+)  = PH.  Since  P(u$,  u’+‘)  = P(u’+‘,  a~$) 2  P(u’c#I’,  u’$‘),  a+  is  a 
To  prove  the  ‘only  if’ part,  let  a$  be  such  that  P(u+,  a+)  =pL.  Let  u’  f  u. Then  if  $(a,  a’)  =  aH 
we  can  find  a  4  such  that  +‘(u’,  a)  =  aH.  Then  u’$’  is  a  strict  best  reply  to  a+,  so  a+  is  not  a 
symmetric  equilibrium  strategy.  On  the  other  hand,  if  +(a,  a’)  =  aL,  we  can  find  a  $’  such  that 
+‘(a’,  a)  =  aL  and  +‘(u’,  a’)  =  aH.  Then  a’$  is  an  alternative  best  reply  to  a+  with  P(u’+‘,  (I’$‘) 
=pH  >pL  = P(u+,  u’+‘),  so  a+  is  not  a NSS. 
Neutral  stability  allows  for  a  set  of  strategies  to  be  collectively  stable  against  invasion  by  other 
strategies,  but  invadable  by  each  other.  This  is  not  a problem,  since  the  NSS  sets  contain  strategies 
that  differ  only  at  information  sets  that  are  never  reached  in  equilibrium. 
The  result  may  be  interpreted  as  follows.  Players  come  to  interaction  situations  like  this  with  a 
population  history  of  previous  play  of  similar  games.  If  trial  and  error  has  gone  on  long  enough  to 
reach  a  stable  state,  there  will  exist  a  language  that  allows  them  to  coordinate  on  the  efficient 
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4.  Concluding  remarks 
The  above  result  does  not  immediately  generalize  to  unanimity  games  with  more  than  two 
strategies.  Consider  the  following  example. 




Assume  pH  >  pM  >  pL  >  0.  The  strategy  a+,  where 
if  U=  (a,  u) 
otherwise, 
is  a  NSS.  An  alternative  best  reply  to  a~$ must  send  the  signal  u  and  respond  with  aM  at  (a,  a).  But 
then  it  will  also  play  aM  against  itself. 
The  positive  result  is  really  an  instance  of  a  more  general  theorem  that  excludes  the  worst 
outcome,  rather  than  guaranteeing  the  best.  The  provision  of  more  conclusive  support  for  the 
intuition  on  communication  and  efficiency  must  be  the  task  of  future  research  in  this  area. 
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